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Corporate venture capitalists, strategic alliances, and the governance of 
newly public firms 
 
Abstract 
We examine the effect of investments by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) on the 
governance structures of venture backed IPOs. One of the main differences between 
CVCs and traditional venture capitalists (TVCs) is that the former often invest for 
strategic reasons and enter into various types of strategic alliances with their portfolio 
firms that last well beyond the IPO. We argue that the presence of such strategic alliances 
will have a significant impact on the governance structure of CVC backed firms when 
they go public and in the following years. Using a sample of venture backed IPOs, we 
evaluate several hypotheses concerning the role of CVCs in the corporate governance of 
newly public firms. We find that strategic CVC backed IPOs have weaker CEOs and 
more outsiders on the board and on the compensation committee than a carefully selected 
sample of matching firms. In addition, the probability of forced CEOs turnover is higher 
for strategic CVC backed IPOs, while at the same time these firms use staggered boards 
more frequently. In contrast, the governance structures of purely financial CVC backed 
IPO firms and their matching firms do not exhibit any significant differences.    3
I. Introduction 
We examine the role corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) play in the governance 
of venture backed IPO issuers. As a private equity investor group whose activity has been 
on the rise over the last 15 years, CVCs are an understudied participant in the private 
equity market. Moreover, CVCs differ from traditional venture capitalists (TVCs) in a 
number of important dimensions. CVCs are the venture arms of industrial corporations, 
and as such they have distinctly different organizational and compensation structures 
from TVCs, which are organized as limited partnerships. More importantly, CVCs have 
different investment objectives than financially focused TVCs. Rather than simply 
seeking to maximize financial returns, CVCs also invest for strategic reasons, financing 
startups that provide various strategic benefits (e.g., windows on new technologies, 
access to promising products, outsourcing of R&D, etc.) to CVC parent companies.  
Thus, CVCs are in a unique situation: they can make venture investments in 
startups and they enter into strategic alliances with them, which usually last for years 
after the startup goes public. However, CVCs’ strategic objectives can be in conflict with 
their financial goals. They are also likely to be in conflict with the objectives of their 
portfolio firm’s management team and other startup investors, which are to maximize 
their own financial benefits.  Thus, by allowing managers of portfolio firms to have wide 
ranging and unchecked decision making power, CVCs face substantial risks of not 
maximizing their own strategic and financial objectives. In addition, valuable strategic 
relations could be lost if a portfolio firm is acquired by a competitor. Given these 
concerns, a portfolio firm’s corporate governance structure can be of great importance to 
a CVC, especially at the time it goes public. We investigate this fundamental issue by 
assessing whether IPO issuers backed by strategic CVCs have distinctly different   4
corporate governance systems than IPO issuers backed by TVCs or financially oriented 
CVCs.  
Using a sample of 276 venture-backed IPOs from the 1992–1999 sample period, 
we document significant differences between the corporate governance of strategic CVC 
backed IPO issuers and that of a control sample of TVC backed IPO issuers. Consistent 
with the predictions of stronger corporate governance, we observe that firms backed by 
strategic CVCs have significantly more outside directors on their boards than either the 
control sample of TVC backed firms or IPO issuers backed by purely financially oriented 
CVCs. The difference is both statistically and economically significant. This evidence 
suggests that one out of every four to five strategic CVC backed IPOs has an additional 
outside director. In addition, strategic CVC backed IPOs appear to have fewer insiders on 
the board compensation committees. We also find that strategic CVC backed IPOs tend 
to sell fewer primary shares at the IPO, which is consistent with the argument that CVCs 
making strategic investments are more interested in preserving their voting rights after 
their portfolio firms go public. 
Also, we document that boards of IPO firms backed by strategic CVCs approve 
strong anti-takeover protections (ATPs) more frequently than IPO firms backed by 
financially oriented CVCs. Furthermore, we find that staggered boards represent the most 
commonly observed ATP. Strategic CVC backed IPOs are more likely to adopt a 
staggered board than other VC backed IPOs. We hypothesize that CVCs making strategic 
investments want strong ATPs to help defend the continued viability of their parent’s 
strategic alliance, which can be threatened by a competitor acquiring the IPO firm and   5
then terminating the startup firm’s strategic relationship with the CVC parent firm.
1 The 
downside with these takeover defenses is potentially greater management entrenchment.  
However, this effect could be offset b weaker management board power. Consistent with 
greater board independence, we find that IPO issuers backed by strategic CVCs exhibit 
higher forced CEO turnover. In terms of economic significance, the results suggest that 
strategic CVC investments increase the probability of forced CEO turnover on average by 
34%. In contrast, comparing IPO issuers backed by financially oriented CVCs with a 
control sample of IPO issuers backed by TVCs, we uncover no significant differences in 
board composition, committee membership, or forced CEO turnover. Lastly, we compare 
IPO firms backed by strategic CVC investors to similar IPO firms with strategic 
relationships, but no strategic CVC backing and find that strategic CVC backed IPOs 
have more independent boards and are associated with higher likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover and greater turnover-performance sensitivity.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, relying on a 
large amount of hand collected governance data, we explore several unique aspects of 
CVC investors and the importance of their strategic objectives to better understand the 
relationship between venture capital (VC) investment and the quality of corporate 
governance. Few studies currently exist which examine the involvement of VCs in firm 
corporate governance. Examining the relation between CEO power and board 
independence, Baker and Gompers (2003) report that VC backed IPO firms have more 
independent boards and less powerful CEOs. Hochberg (2005) also finds VC backed IPO 
firms have more independent boards and audit and compensation committees, and are 
                                                 
1 This is a particularly interesting situation, since ATPs are generally viewed as a device to entrench 
management, but it this case, it appears to be created to entrench the board and the strategic alliance.   6
less likely to have a dual CEO/chairman. Wangsunwai (2007) finds that firms backed by 
more reputable VCs have more independent boards.  
This study is also related to the growing literature on the corporate governance of 
firms recently going public. Klausner and Daines (2001) and Field and Karpoff (2002) 
examine anti-takeover protections, while Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2006) study 
board size and composition at newly public firms. We investigate a separate issue, 
namely how CVCs impact the corporate governance structures of their portfolio firms 
prior to going public and in the first few years thereafter. We document that CVC 
strategic objectives and the strategic alliances of CVC parent firms appear to affect the 
structure of corporate governance in IPO firms.   
Second, the paper is related to a strand of corporate finance literature that focuses 
on strategic alliances (see Allen and Phillips (2000), Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and 
Martin (1997), Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), and Pablo and Subramaniam (2004)). 
These studies generally find such alliances to be value increasing. For example, Allen 
and Phillips (2000) find that alliances, joint ventures, and other product market relations 
combined with corporate block ownership lead to significant increases in target stock 
prices and significant improvements in their profitability and operating performance. 
Pablo and Subramaniam (2002) find that strategic alliances coupled with equity stakes 
alleviate the capital constraints of smaller, high-growth firms and their announcements 
lead to significantly positive market reactions. Unlike the prior studies, we examine a 
particularly important form of strategic alliances – alliances between CVCs and newly 
public firms. In these relationships, CVCs invest in these young firms, while they are still 
private and the relationship typically extends well beyond the IPO. Such relations present   7
an excellent opportunity to evaluate the theories on the structure and evolution of 
strategic alliances.  
Third, this study sheds new light on the issue of corporate governance in strategic 
alliances (e.g., Aghion and Tirole (1994), Lerner and Elfenbein (2003), Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1988)). Hellmann (2002) suggests that if the startup is a 
complement to the corporation, it would be better off being financed by the CVC. If 
CVCs and TVCs have distinct abilities, Hellmann’s model predicts that CVCs would 
have board seats and would actively provide support to the startup. While previous 
studies of corporate governance focus on the equity stakes and board participation of the 
alliance partners, we undertake a more comprehensive examination, which includes board 
structure, CEO power and anti-takeover mechanisms. CVCs investment activity offers an 
important opportunity to study issues of corporate governance in strategic alliances 
because their parent companies are indirectly major investors in startups giving them the 
opportunity to strongly influence the development of corporate governance in these 
young firms.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section II sets forth the hypotheses we are 
going to test, Section III describes the data used in the analysis, Section IV presents the 
empirical results, Section V analyzes strategic CVC investments versus general alliances, 
and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Testable hypotheses 
In this section, we present several hypotheses regarding the role of CVCs in the 
governance of newly private firms. Corporate VCs, although in the same general line of 
business as traditional VC firms, are distinctly different in a number of important   8
dimensions. They have different investment objectives and incentives as well as different 
organizational and compensation structure. These differences have an important impact 
on their performance (see Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Santhanakrishnan (2002)), as 
well as their ability to add value to startups (Ivanov and Xie (2006) and Chemmanur and 
Loutskina (2007)). We also argue that CVCs will have different incentives from TVCs 
when structuring the corporate governance systems of startup firms going public. More 
specifically, we examine what governance mechanisms CVCs use and how these differ 
between CVC backed and TVC backed IPOs.  
A distinctive feature of VC investors is that they hold large equity stakes and 
obtain significant control rights in the startups they finance. This is a way for them to 
manage the significant risks, moral hazard problems and uncertainties associated with 
venture investments. Previous studies (see Lerner (1995), Kaplan and Stromberg (2003, 
2004)) document that the strength of VC control rights is inversely proportional to a 
startup’s performance. VCs gradually relinquish these rights as the startup’s performance 
improves and it nears an IPO. The IPO represents a shock to the governance systems of 
startups. The powerful control rights of VCs disappear as their convertible preferred 
stock with its enhanced control rights is forced to convert into ordinary shares.  Also, 
prior to going public, private firms usually restructure their corporate governance to meet 
exchange listing and disclosure standards and also to become more attractive to outside 
investors. As major pre-IPO investors, CVCs have significant influence over a start-up 
firm’s choice of governance systems. 
To enhance both their expected returns and private equity reputations, VCs have 
incentives to set up effective corporate governance systems before startups go public. 
VCs raise new funds usually every three to four years. This means that very frequently   9
they must find investors (limited partners) willing to commit capital to their new VC 
funds. However, investor interest is strongly related to the performance of the VC’s 
previous funds. VCs typically realize their highest returns when they take portfolio firms 
public. However, VCs do not exit from their companies on the IPO date; they usually 
must wait for a 6 month lock-up period to expire. Underwriters typically require private 
equity investors to retain their shares for 6 months following the IPO.  In addition, VCs 
frequently keep a portion of their equity stake even after the IPO lockup period expires 
(Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990)). Thus, VCs need to ensure that their 
portfolio firms have good governance systems in place when they go public in order to 
protect the value of their on-going investments in these firms.  
Like other VC investors, CVCs repeatedly access the IPO market by bringing new 
portfolio companies public and their reputations affect the willingness of investment 
bankers to underwrite these IPOs. If CVC backed IPO firms are known to have poor 
performance, then future IPOs backed by these same CVCs are likely to experience weak 
underwriter interest. To preserve their reputational capital, CVCs have an incentive to 
implement good governance systems in the startups they finance. In addition, CVCs also 
have to wait for the lock-up periods to expire to cash out of their positions. Hence, CVCs 
like TVCs have similar incentives to ensure that their portfolio firms have good 
governance systems in place before going public.   
CVCs also have an additional incentive to establish effective governance 
mechanisms to curb managerial entrenchment and private benefits of control. Unlike 
TVCs, CVCs primarily invest for strategic reasons. As a result, they often enter into 
formal or informal strategic or business relationships with their portfolio firms, which 
tend to last for a number of years after these companies go public. These strategic   10
relationships can take on various forms: a) supplier or customer relations, b) product 
development agreements; c) joint research agreements; d) marketing and distribution 
agreements; e) licensing agreements, etc. These relationships offer important strategic as 
well as financial benefits to CVC parent corporations.  
Strategic alliances can be plagued by a host of contracting problems in the highly 
risky industries in which CVCs usually invest.  Financial contracts in such settings are 
usually incomplete because the parties can neither anticipate nor reliably observe all the 
possible outcomes. This information contracting environment can lead to opportunistic 
behavior by one of the two parties. For example, one party in the strategic relationship 
may exploit the other by exerting insufficient effort, underinvesting, or appropriating a 
disproportionate share of the joint surplus created by the relation. Thus, some additional 
mechanisms are required in order for a strategic alliance to be initially viable and to 
remain so. According to the literature on incomplete contracting (see Klein, Crawford, 
and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1988, 2001)), equity ownership 
and control rights in startups can mitigate potential hold-up problems between the parties 
in a strategic alliance, which in our case are CVC parents and startups. A distinctive 
feature of CVC strategic investments is that CVCs often hold equity stakes in the 
portfolio companies after they go public and continue to sit on their boards. Given their 
long standing investment in startup firms, CVCs are also apt to be better informed about 
the future prospects of the firms they fund.  
As strategic investors, CVCs have incentives to seek greater control rights than 
other investors because they have more to loose due to their strategic objectives. CVC 
parents can be hurt if the portfolio firm’s management is unwilling to pursue operating 
and investment decisions that are complementary or at least not damaging to the CVC   11
parent’s or if a portfolio firm is acquired, which could threaten its commercial 
relationships with the portfolio firm as well as change its operating and investment 
decisions. CVCs generally have important strategic objectives that can be consistent with, 
independent of or in conflict with the goal of maximizing the financial returns from their 
equity investment in the portfolio firm. Since, manager incentives are generally aimed at 
maximizing the portfolio firm’s financial returns, strategically oriented CVCs are taking 
greater risk when they allow startup firm managers unchecked decision making power. 
Thus, CVCs have incentives to seek greater decision making power in their portfolio 
firms than other VCs and to limit management influence by establishing effective 
corporate governance systems that can help protect their strategic goals after a startup 
goes public, and they lose their special control rights.  
It should also be recognized that there can be conflicts of interest between CVCs 
and TVCs. TVCs and entrepreneurs often have the same objective – maximizing the 
financial returns on their investments. This might be in conflict with the strategic 
objectives of CVCs. Thus, entrepreneurs might rely on TVCs for protection against 
unchecked CVC power. Hellmann’s (2002) model predicts that a startup entrepreneur 
will prefer TVC investors or CVC investors if its parent sells complementary products or 
services. Hence CVCs might prefer to work with weaker, less reputable TVCs when they 
invest for strategic reasons since this would enable them to have greater influence over 
major decisions such as a startup’s corporate governance mechanisms and its potential 
exit strategies. On the other hand, CVCs can benefit from co-investing with reputable 
TVCs. VC syndication could lead to better deal flow and screening of potential venture 
investments, larger pools of capital, risk sharing, and more private equity contacts to help 
develop startup operations. The fact that TVCs have an incentive to support efficient   12
governance structures that will help ensure that managers do not behave opportunistically 
also helps protect CVC strategic investments. Aghion and Tirole (1994), in their model of 
the organization of R&D activity, show that it is optimal for CVCs (“customer” in their 
model) to have TVCs as co-investors since it can help raise CVC profits. Thus, 
syndication with TVCs can be beneficial for CVCs (both from a strategic and financial 
viewpoint) and can also alleviate entrepreneurial concerns about being expropriated by 
CVCs. 
Given the difference in investment strategies between CVCs and TVCs, we 
conjecture that important differences will be observed in the corporate governance of 
CVC backed and TVC backed IPO firms. More importantly, we argue that such 
differences will be especially pronounced when comparing strategic CVC investments to 
TVC backed IPOs. Unlike other strategic alliance partners, CVC equity stakes in startups 
are relatively large (16.4% versus 2.5%), and thus they are in a much better position to 
affect the corporate governance systems of their portfolio companies before these firms 
go public. Given the impact of an IPO on a VC-backed firm’s corporate governance, 
CVCs may set up certain governance mechanisms pre-IPO to ensure that their interests 
continue to be protected. On the other hand, significant differences between the 
governance systems of IPO firms backed by financially oriented CVCs and those backed 
by TVCs are unlikely.  This follows since financially oriented CVCs have incentives very 
similar to TVCs to support corporate governance mechanisms that maximizing the 
financial returns on their equity investments. 
We propose several hypotheses, which are empirically evaluated in the next 
section. We test the validity of these hypotheses against the null hypothesis that CVC 
backing (for strategic reasons or purely financial reasons) has no additional impact on the   13
governance systems of VC-backed IPO issuers. CVCs can be just one more venture 
investor and in most cases they are not even lead VC investors. One possibility is that the 
VC syndicate as a group (or the lead VC) determines the governance structure of the 
firm, so that even when a strategically motivated CVC is in the VC syndicate, its 
marginal role is very minor and not easily detected empirically. In addition, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that CVCs often do not actively monitor their portfolio firms
2.  
Our first hypothesis focuses on how quickly different types of VC firms unwind 
their equity holdings following IPOs. Since strategically oriented CVCs have an incentive 
to continue monitoring their portfolio firms beyond the IPO, we conjecture that CVCs on 
average hold equity positions post-IPO for longer periods than TVCs. We formally state 
this in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Strategically motivated CVCs (1) will hold a larger percentage of equity relative to 
managers, (2) support smaller percentages of new shares in IPOs to minimize dilution of 
their voting rights, and (3) will hold equity positions in VC backed IPOs for longer 
period of time than financially motivated CVCs or TVCs. 
 
We also expect CEOs in IPO firms to exercise less power relative to strategic 
CVC investors, who should demand more board power relative to management. 
Consistent with the arguments in favor of a less powerful CEO, we expect strategic CVC 
investors in IPO issuers to push for more independent directors on these boards and their 
key committees than other VC investors. More outsiders on the board will constrain CEO 
power, limit managerial entrenchment, and thus protect CVCs’ interests in strategic 
                                                 
2 Our analysis of strategic CVC investments suggests that CVCs tend to invest in earlier rounds, which 
provides some support to the argument that CVCs have a significant influence on the governance of 
startups.    14
alliances. In addition, we expect strategic CVC backed IPOs to employ fewer gray 
directors (outside directors that have some commercial or financial relationship to the 
firm) since they are less independent of the CEO’s influence.  For the same reason, CVCs 
should demand that an independent, non-executive officer be chairman of the board. This 
analysis can be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: IPO firms backed by strategic CVC investors will have (1) a greater percentage of 
outsiders on the board and its key committees (2) a smaller percentage of gray directors, 
(3) a smaller percentage of inside directors and (4) fewer incidences of CEO/Chairman 
duality) than IPOs backed by TVCs or purely financial oriented CVC investors. 
 
Another important consequence of the incentives of strategic CVCs and their 
relative power with respect to senior management is the likelihood of forcefully replacing 
the company’s CEO. This is one of the key decisions that the board makes and it has 
long-lasting repercussions for the firm’s investment and financing policies and 
performance. Since managerial opportunism could endanger the benefits of their long-
term strategic relationships, we expect that CVCs will use their board power and try to 
replace CEOs who exhibit poor performance or who extract excessive private benefits. 
H2 suggests that it would be easier to displace a CEO in an IPO firm backed by a 
strategic CVC since CEO board power is weaker in these firms. This is a prediction that 
we test directly using information on CEO turnovers in our sample.    
 
H3: Forced CEO turnover is more likely in IPO issuers backed by strategic CVC 
investors. There should also be greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to firm 
performance. 
   15
It is well known that many IPO firms get acquired soon after they go public (see 
Daily Deal, March 22, 2000). In addition, Dai, Anderson, Bittlingmayer (2006) reports 
that VC backed IPO firms are more likely to be acquired in the first few years after their 
IPOs compared to non-VC backed IPOs. Early acquisitions can be undesirable for CVCs 
because it could jeopardize valuable strategic relationships. Thus, CVCs are likely to 
support stronger defensive mechanisms when their portfolio firms go public. 
A large arsenal of anti-takeover provisions exists to protect firms from unwanted 
bidders. Arrangements such as staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the 
bylaws and the charter, supermajority requirements and poison pills are known to protect 
the board from being quickly replaced. However, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) 
argue that these arrangements are some of the most important preemptive legal takeover 
defenses available and they find convincing empirical support this conclusion.  Bebchuk, 
Coates, and Subramanian (2002) argue that staggered boards are the most important 
takeover defense and find strong empirical support for this position. Field and Karpoff 
(2002) study the frequency of takeover defenses in IPO firms, but fail to find a significant 
effect of VC backing. However, they do not distinguish between CVCs and TVCs, nor do 
they distinguish between strategic and financial CVC investors, which we argue are 
crucial distinctions. We formalize the above analysis in the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: IPOs backed by strategic CVC investors are likely to have stronger takeover 
defenses than those backed by financially oriented CVCs or TVCs.  Stronger takeover 
protections, especially staggered boards, are especially likely to be adopted in IPO firms 
backed by strategically oriented CVCs. 
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III. Data 
The data for this study comes from Thompson Financial’s VentureXpert database 
and Jay Ritter’s IPO website, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. We begin by 
extracting all the VC backed IPOs listed on a major US exchange in the 1992-1999 
period. There are 138 IPO by US firms having VC investment by US corporations in this 
sample period (CVC backed IPOs). The IPOs in our sample are backed by the venture 
arms of some of the biggest and most respected corporations in the economy, such as 
Microsoft, Intel, GE, Cisco Systems, AOL, and Xerox. Because the motives of CVC 
investors can vary substantially, we classify each of the 138 CVC IPOs into strategic or 
purely financial objectives. The classification is based on information provided in offer 
prospectuses, annual reports, and other corporate filings.  
When a CVC parent has a strategic alliance, joint development agreement, 
licensing agreement, or similar arrangement with the IPO firm, we classify the CVC 
investment as strategic. Similarly, if the prospectus explicitly states that there is a 
customer/supplier relation between the CVC and the IPO firm, we also classify this as a 
strategic CVC investment. When a CVC has no strategic alliances with the firm we 
classify it as a purely financial investor. This classification scheme yields 94 strategic 
CVC investments and 44 purely financial CVC investments. Of course all of these CVC 
backed IPOs also have TVC investors as well.  
Since TVC backed IPOs are more frequent than their CVC backed counterparts, 
we select a control group of 138 TVC backed IPOs (with no CVC investors) that have the 
same three- and four-digit SICs and similar size (pre-IPO sales within 50%-150% of 
those of CVC backed IPOs) to the CVC backed IPOs. For each IPO in our sample, we 
collect data on ownership, management, and board structure from the IPO prospectus and   17
proxy statements for the five years after the IPO. The identities of the participating VCs 
are taken from VentureXpert. In our analysis, we take into account the panel data 
characteristics of our sample by estimating firm fixed effects and random effects models.  
Our final sample has 1,240 firm-year observations by 276 IPO firms.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our VC-backed IPO sample. Compared to 
other IPO studies, most IPOs in our sample are in high-tech industries – business 
services, computers, electronics, and biotech. This is not surprising given VC preferences 
for investing in newer, high-growth industries. Our IPOs are roughly half the size of the 
Baker and Gompers (2003) sample, though they report asset values in the IPO year, 
which captures the effect of the equity offering, while we report asset values for the prior 
year and draw our sample from a more recent period.  In addition, strategic CVCs invest 
in IPO issuers that are younger and smaller than their financial CVC counterparts. 
However they are able to obtain higher IPO proceeds – their median proceeds are $43 
million compared to a median value of $39 million for IPOs backed by financial CVCs. 
This is consistent with the finding of Ivanov and Xie (2006) that strategic CVC backed 
IPOs have higher valuations than other VC backed IPOs. Compared to their matched 
firms, strategic CVC backed IPOs, besides having larger IPO proceeds, are backed by 
more prestigious underwriters. We find similar patterns in the subsample of financial 
CVC backed IPOs. This sample of IPO firms tends to be older and have larger proceeds 
than their matched TVC-backed firms.  
 
IV. Empirical results 
Panels A and B of Table 2 present summary statistics for the subsamples of 
strategic and financial CVC backed IPOs, respectively. Table 2 shows that IPOs affiliated   18
with strategic CVCs on average have a higher equity ownership level and a longer 
holding period than financial CVCs. Median equity holdings of financial CVCs are 
essentially zero after year 1, while those of strategic CVCs do not fall to zero until the 4
th 
or 5
th calendar year after the IPO. Tests for equality of medians (not reported here for the 
sake of brevity) suggest that the equity ownership of strategic CVCs is significantly 
higher than that of their financially oriented counterparts from year -1 until year 3, where 
year 0 is the IPO year. A similar conclusion can be made about board participation in the 
cases of strategic and financial CVC investors. Strategic CVCs tend to have more 
directors, although the differences disappear after year 3. Tests show that strategic CVCs 
hold significantly more board seats than financially oriented CVCs in the first three years. 
These findings are intuitively plausible because strategic CVC directors have more to 
gain by being actively involved and remaining on the board longer.  
Table 2A also shows that the equity ownership of strategic CVCs and TVCs in 
their portfolio companies continues until year 5 and the median equity holdings are 
different from zero until year 3. The ownership stake of TVCs is significantly higher than 
that of CVCs, but this is due to the fact that we report cumulative ownership of all TVCs 
investing in a given company. An important implication of the comparisons that can be 
drawn from Table 2A is that strategic CVCs do not appear to maintain post-IPO 
shareholdings longer than TVCs. Therefore, the results do not provide any support for 
H1. In addition, the results in Table 2B suggest that there are no differences in CEO 
ownership and tenure between strategic and financial CVC backed IPOs and their control 
firms. However, strategic CVCs on average have higher share ownership stakes than 
CEOs in years -1, 0 and +1, while financial CVCs have higher equity stakes than CEOs 
in years -1 and 0.  Also, CEO share ownership is significantly larger than financial CVCs   19
after year +1 and larger than strategic CVCs after year +3. These findings provide some 
support for our conjecture in H1 that CVCs investing for strategic reasons will tend to 
have higher ownership than CEOs, even after an IPO. In addition, we do not find any 
significant differences regarding gray directors and CEO/Chairman duality between CVC 
backed and TVC backed IPOs or between strategic CVC backed and financial CVC 
backed IPOs. These findings do not provide support for H2.  
Lastly, we investigate whether firms with strategic CVC backing tend to sell 
fewer shares in their IPOs. This is one way for the CVCs to preserve their voting power 
and influence over the startup and limit potential hostile bids. A smaller IPO issue means 
a lower dilution of the CVC’s voting rights. We compare the ratio of primary shares sold 
at the IPO to shares outstanding before the offering. The information on pre-IPO shares 
and primary shares sold at the IPO comes from SDC’s New Issues database. In some 
cases the information on pre-IPO shares is missing, so we use information from the IPO 
prospectuses to fill in the missing observations. The results of the univariate analysis are 
reported in Panel A of Table 3. We find that firms with strategic CVC backing sell a 
smaller percentage of shares than both their matching firms and IPO issuers backed by 
financially oriented CVCs. The median fraction of primary shares of IPO issuers with 
strategic CVC backing is 26.1%, which is significantly smaller than that of their 
matching firms (37.2%) and IPOs backed by financially oriented CVCs (31.6%).  
We also investigate the percentage of primary shares issued using a regression 
framework to control for the effects of other differences in IPO characteristics. In Panel B 
of Table 3, we regress the percentage of primary shares on a number of firm-specific and 
offer-specific variables and CEO characteristics. Again, the results show that strategic 
CVC IPOs sell a significantly smaller percentage of primary shares compared to other   20
VC backed IPOs. In all the specifications, the Strategic variable is negative and 
significant. These results support H1: CVCs making strategic investments are more 
interested in preserving their voting rights after their portfolio firms go public.  
 
IV.A. Board composition 
We next consider the board structure to be the result of bargaining between CEOs 
and outside investors, in the spirit of Baker and Gompers (2003). We measure CEO 
power over the board of directors by the portion of officer-directors on the board (inside 
directors). Inside directors have strong incentives to support the CEO’s positions in board 
decisions since any lack of loyalty could result in the officer being fired by the CEO. We 
begin by examining board size. The results in Tables 2A and 2B suggest that strategic 
CVC backed firms have larger boards (median of 7) than their control firms (median of 
6) in the IPO year and the difference persists for at least two more years. On the other 
hand, the board size of financial CVC backed IPOs (median of 6) is significantly 
different than that of their control firms (median of 5) only in the IPO year. The post-IPO 
board size of financial CVC backed IPOs is not significantly different from its control 
sample.  
Turning to board composition, we find that strategic CVC backed IPOs have more 
outsiders on their boards. As Table 2A shows, the difference in the median percentage of 
outside directors is insignificant for strategic CVC backed IPOs and their control firms in 
the IPO year (the median percentage of outside directors in strategic CVC backed firms is 
73.2%, compared with 71.4% for the control sample). However, the strategic CVC 
backed firms have a significantly larger fraction of outside directors in four of the five 
post-IPO years. In contrast, financial CVC backed IPOs have a similar number of outside   21
directors on their boards as their control firms in the IPO year and the following 5 years.
3 
We also find that strategic CVC backed IPOs have significantly smaller fraction of 
insider directors than their matching firms as well as in comparison to financial CVC 
backed IPOs.  
While outside directors are likely to exhibit greater independence from the CEO, 
there are important exceptions in terms of what is termed gray directors. These are 
directors who are related to the CEO, executives in other firms that sell goods and 
services to the firm in question, interlocking directors, or directors that have personal 
contracts with the firm or its subsidiaries. These directors have special incentives to 
support the CEO’s positions in board deliberations due to their familial, financial or 
business connections. Thus, we define independent directors to be non-gray outside 
directors.   
Tables 4A and 4B presents estimates from pooled cross-section time series 
regressions of the fraction of outside directors as a dependent variable with standard 
errors robust to heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The explanatory variables include 
several CEO characteristics (age and tenure) and indicators for a founder and chairman of 
the board to capture CEO influence on the board. We also control for several firm 
characteristics including firm size (measured by log of sales in the prior year), age, 
research intensity, cash flows, underwriter reputation and VC reputation. In constructing 
these variables, we use many of the same variables in Baker and Gompers (2003) and 
Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2006). As a VC reputation measure, we use the age of 
the lead VC, where a lead VC is defined as the VC with the earliest investment in the 
firm. If there are two or more VCs at the initial round, we select the VC with the largest 
                                                 
3 Another group of outside directors who may lack independence from the CEO are former officers and 
employees of the firm.   22
investment as the lead VC.
4 The number of observations included in the regression is 
smaller than 1,240 because some firms in the sample do not have data on research 
intensity and cash flows.  In Tables 4A and 4B we use both firm fixed effects and random 
effects models, where firm level heterogeneity is assumed to be time-invariant in both 
models. 
Model 1 of Table 4A includes an indicator for strategic CVC investors. The 
coefficient on the strategic CVC indicator is positive (0.037) and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. This means that the presence of a strategic CVC investment increases the 
proportion of outside directors by roughly 5%. Interpreting this coefficient’s economic 
significance, it says that that one in every four strategic CVC backed IPOs has an 
additional outside director (given that the average board of our IPO sample has 
approximately seven members, of which about five are outside directors). In addition, 
consistent with the findings of Baker and Gompers (2003), we document that the fraction 
of outsiders on the board is decreasing in cash flows as a fraction of sales. Like Boone et 
al. (2006), we also find that the fraction of independent directors is negatively related to 
CEO ownership.  
In Model 2 of Table 4A we include an indicator variable that equals one if there is 
a strategic CVC investor, who also serves as the lead investor in the VC syndicate. We 
expect that lead CVCs are likely to have a strong influence on corporate governance 
mechanisms adopted by the firm prior to going public. The coefficient on the strategic 
CVC indicator is 0.039 and is significant at the 5% level, which indicates that IPO firms 
with strategic CVC investors are positively associated with larger fractions of outsider 
                                                 
4 We used alternative definitions of lead VC (the VC with the largest equity stake and the VC with the 
longest board membership) and reputation measures (amount of capital under management, number of 
firms taken public, etc.) and found qualitatively similar results.    23
directors. However, there is no significant marginal effect when the CVC is the lead 
syndicate investor. 
In column 3 of Table 4A we also include company and year fixed effects to better 
account for the statistical properties of panel data. The results are again similar to what 
we find with the previous two models. The coefficient on the strategic CVC indicator is 
0.150 and is significant at the 5% level. In column 4 of Table 4A, we estimate a random 
effects GLS model. If we assume that the unobserved firm heterogeneity is distributed 
independently of the regressors, then we can use a random effects model to estimate the 
panel regression. The main benefit of this approach is that it yields consistent estimates of 
all the parameters, including the time-invariant regressors, such as Strategic. The results 
mirror those of the previous specifications. Since our dependent variable is bounded by 0 
and 1, in column 5 of Table 4A we estimate a generalized linear model, which is 
specifically designed to deal with fractional response data (see Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996)). This model uses a logit transformation of the dependent variable so that it maps 
onto the real line. The estimation results show that the coefficient on Strategic CVC 
indicator continues to be positive (0.181) and is significant at the 1% level (t-stat of 2.63). 
Thus, the analysis in this subsection suggests that strategic CVC backed IPOs have a 
larger fraction of outside directors than other VC backed IPOs, and this difference is both 
statistically and economically significant. Thus, the results supports hypothesis H2.  
One alternative explanation for our board composition results is that strategically 
oriented CVCs simply select startups with more independent boards. If this is the case, 
then the residuals in our regressions will be correlated with the Strategic CVC indicator, 
thus leading to biased coefficients. We address this selection bias concern in several 
ways. First, we include in the analysis only the strategic CVC backed IPOs that received   24
their first corporate venture investments at an early stage of their life.
5  Thus, board 
structure is likely to be much malleable and subject to substantial change prior to going 
public. The results are reported in the second column of Table 4B. The coefficient on 
Strategic is positive (0.056) and statistically significant (t-stat=2.66). Second, we run the 
regression only on IPOs (both CVC and TVC backed) that receive their first round of 
CVC (for CVC backed firms) or TVC (for the matching firms) financing at an early 
stage. Early-stage startups are the ones with highest degrees of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry about both future prospects and governance characteristics. The 
results from this sub-sample of IPOs are given in Model 2 in Table 4B. Again, the 
coefficient on Strategic is positive (0.44) and significant (t-stat=1.94).  
Third, we address the CVC endogeneity issue by using an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach. We use three variables as instruments for strategic CVC investing: 
aggregate CVC investments as a portion of total VC investments in the year prior to the 
year in which a given startup received its first VC investment, the stage at which an IPO 
receives its first VC investment (early or late), and the average number of companies that 
the VCs investing in the startup have taken public. These three variables are significantly 
correlated with the Strategic CVC indicator, but not with the dependent variable. The 
Hansen-Sargan test of overconfidence restrictions cannot reject the null that the 
instruments satisfy the required orthogonality conditions (p-value=0.78), suggesting that 
these three variables are valid instruments. The results from the IV regression are 
reported as Model 3 of Table 4B. The coefficient on Strategic remains positive, but is 
higher than in the previous specifications (0.210).  The Strategic CVC indicator also 
                                                 
5 We follow the VentureXpert classification of VC backed IPOs into early-stage and late-stage investments. 
If a firm is designated by VentureXpert as ‘Early Stage’, ‘Other Early’, ‘Seed’, or ‘Startup’ then we 
classify it as early stage. If a firm is designated by VentureXpert as ‘First Stage’, ‘Second Stage, ‘Third 
Stage’, ‘Expansion’, ‘Other Expansion’, ‘Bridge’, ‘Bridge Loan’, or ‘Other Later Stage’ then we classify it 
as late stage.    25
remains statistically significant, although the level of statistical significance decreases (t-
stat=2.11) relative to the earlier specifications. Thus, the earlier results continue to hold 
even after we control for the potential endogeneity of CVCs initial investment choices.  
Lastly, we try to control for the endogeneity of the CEO/COB variable. It is 
possible that the CEO is more likely to be a chairman if the board is less independent. 
This could explain the positive and significant coefficients on this variable. To control for 
this potential endogeneity, we again employ an IV regression, in which we instrument for 
CEO/COB using the CEO/Founder variable. The results of this regression are shown in 
the last column of Table 4B. The coefficient estimate on the instrumented CEO/COB 
variable continues to be positive, though it no longer is statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, Strategic CVC indicator is still positive and significant. 
 
IV.B. Board committees 
The board generally establishes several committees to provide oversight on top 
management and to actively participate in the governance of the corporation. The most 
important committees are audit, compensation, and nominating. The audit committee 
usually makes recommendations to the board regarding the selection of independent 
auditors, reviews the financial results and the scope of the audit and other services 
provided by independent auditors, and reviews and evaluates the company’s internal 
control functions. The compensation committee decides on and evaluates compensation 
packages for employees, including the CEO and administers the company’s stock plans. 
The nominating committee recommends candidates for senior management positions as 
well as for election to the board of directors. The proportion of outsiders on these 
committees is another measure of the power balance between the CEO and outside   26
investors. H2 predicts that the key committees of IPO firms with strategic CVC investors 
have a majority of outside directors. While all of the IPOs in our sample have audit and 
compensation committees, the majority of them do not have a nominating committee. 
However, it should be noted that the lack of a nominating committee is likely to give a 
CEO greater influence over board nominations.  
We first examine the composition of audit and compensation committees using a 
probit model. The dependent variables are respectively equal to one if the audit or 
compensation committee is composed entirely of independent directors at the IPO, and 
zero otherwise. Independent directors exclude any outside gray directors. We use a 
similar set of control variables like the one used by Klein (1998 and 2002) in her analysis 
of board committee composition. We also include Strategic, an indicator variable for the 
presence of a strategic CVC investor.  
The estimates from the probit model are presented in Table 5. The first model 
analyzes compensation committee composition. Strategic has a positive coefficient of 
0.44, which is significant at the 5% level (Z-stat=2.07), which we interpret as showing 
greater compensation committee independence. The result is also economically 
significant. The presence of a strategic CVC investor increases the probability of an 
independent compensation committee by roughly 10%. Of the other explanatory 
variables, only the log of the CEO age is positive and significant. Thus, it appears that 
strategic CVC backed companies have an important bearing on the independence of 
compensation committees. We do not find that CVC backing has a significant impact on 
the composition of the audit committee. Further tests reveal that the impact of strategic 
CVC investors on the composition of the compensation committee remains significant in 
the first year after the IPO (Strategic has a coefficient of 0.50 with Z-stat=2.42). As an   27
additional test, we examine whether CEO membership on the compensation or audit 
committee is less likely in the presence of strategic CVC investor, but do not find any 
significant effects.  
As an additional test of CEO power, we examine whether a firm has a nominating 
committee independent of the CEO at the time of the offering. The dependent variable is 
equal to one if the firm has a nominating committee, and zero otherwise.
6 In this analysis, 
we exclude the CEO_Founder indicator variable because it perfectly predicts the 
presence of a nominating committee. As the last regression in Table 5 suggests, strategic 
CVC backed firms are more likely to have a nominating committee, but the coefficient on 
the Strategic CVC indicator is not statistically significant.  
 
IV.C. Anti-Takeover Protections 
Next we turn to the analysis of takeover defenses CVC and TVC backed IPOs. 
We measure the degree of takeover protection using a version of the index proposed by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005). They consider six governance provisions – 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements 
for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden 
parachutes. We make two changes – instead of golden parachutes, which are not 
frequently encountered in IPO firms, we include severance agreements that contain 
payments equal to at least the manager’s annual salary and instead of poison pills, we use 
blank check preferred stock since few IPOs have poison pills. If H3 holds, then we expect 
strategic CVC backed IPOs to have higher ATP index levels, since CVCs have incentives 
                                                 
6 In robustness analysis, we examine firms with nominating committees that exclude the CEO as a member.   28
to protect their companies from being acquired by potential competitors, unlike TVCs 
which could see added financial gains from such acquisitions.  
Tables 6A and 6B reports the results of a univariate analysis between CVC 
backed IPOs and their matching firms. We compare ATP index levels as well as their 
components across types of CVC backed IPOs and their matching firms. In Table 5A we 
find that there is no significant difference between the ATP levels in strategic CVC 
backed IPOs and their matching firms. On the other hand, Table 6B shows that IPO firms 
backed by financial CVC have lower ATP index levels than their control firms (the 
difference is significant at the 5% level). This result is consistent with the predictions of 
H4. So strategic CVC backed IPOs employ more takeover defenses, which could ward 
off bids by competitors of the CVC parent. While higher APTs could result in greater 
management entrenchment, this effect could be offset by the fact that strategic CVC 
backed IPOs have more independent boards. Thus, these independent directors could 
exert pressure to limit CEO empire-building, shirking and excessive perquisite 
consumption, while using ATPs to protect the strategic alliance from potential 
competitors. Thus, strategic CVCs are likely to find that having a higher ATP index 
levels to be beneficial. In further analysis, we examine the frequency of acquisitions in 
the following 3 years and find that CVC parents and competitors of the CVC parent are 
equally likely to be the acquirer.  
We further examine the differences in these takeover defenses in Tables 6A and 
6B, where we compare each component of the ATP index. Since staggered boards are 
considered the strongest common takeover defense, we focus on this particular ATP. We 
find that strategic CVC backed IPOs employ staggered boards more often than their 
control firms or financial CVC backed IPO firms. Staggered boards are present in 63.3%   29
of the strategic CVC backed IPOs, while they occur in only 51.1% of the matched firms 
(the difference is significant at the 10% level) and in 45.2% of the IPOs backed by 
financial CVCs. There is no difference between CVC backed IPOs and their control firms 
with respect to the other elements of the ATP index. This evidence supports the above-
mentioned argument that CVCs have greater incentive to employ more anti-takeover 
mechanisms. On the other hand, staggered boards allow managers to entrench themselves 
and thus, might be shareholder value destroying (see Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and 
Faleye (2006)), which might negatively affect the value of a CVC’s strategic investments. 
However, strategic CVCs also address the negative effects of managerial entrenchment 
by encouraging its IPO firms to appoint more independent boards and key committees, 
which could more than offset the entrenchment effects of senior management.  
To further analyze these questions, we use a regression framework to control for 
other IPO characteristics, which could differ across the two samples. We then examine 
the determinants of the decision to adopt a staggered board, which is a particularly 
effective ATP.
7 We use a probit model to examine this question where the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the firm has a staggered board at the time of the IPO, and is 0 
otherwise. We use a model specification similar to Pompilio (2007), who investigates the 
general impact of VC backing on the decision to adopt a staggered board.  
The results are presented in Table 7. We can see that the presence of strategic 
CVC investor is associated with a higher probability of adopting a staggered board. In 
Model 1, the coefficient on the Strategic indicator variable is 0.271, which is significant 
at the 10% level (z-stat=1.78). In terms of economic significance, the results suggest that 
the presence of a strategic CVC investor increases the likelihood of a staggered board by 
                                                 
7 Recent studies (see, for example, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007)) present evidence that 
staggered boards have a significantly negative effect on firm value.   30
roughly 11%. In Model 2 we include an indicator variable equal to one if the strategic 
CVC is also the lead investor in the firm. The coefficient on this variable, however, is not 
significantly different from zero.  
In Model 3 we control for the fact that the decision to adopt a staggered board 
might be endogenous with respect to strategic CVC backing. CVC might invest for 
strategic reasons in startups which already have a staggered board. To deal with this 
selection issue, we use a bivariate probit model, where we first model the strategic CVC 
investment decision and then estimate the model with staggered board as a dependent 
variable. We use the same specification for the strategic CVC selection model as the one 
in Section IV.A. The results from the bivariate model specification are qualitatively 
similar to those in Models 1 and 2. The coefficient on the Strategic is positive (0.622) and 
statistically significant (z-stat=2.60). Thus, using both univariate and multivariate 
analysis, we document that strategic CVC investors are associated with a significantly 
higher likelihood of adopting a staggered board. This is consistent with our H3: CVCs 
making strategic investments also try to protect their parents’ strategic interests by 
reducing the probability that these startups are later acquired by potential competitors. 
Our findings also complement the results in Pompilio (2007) by showing that a specific 
type of VC investors (CVCs), which has different investment incentives and objectives, 
which have an important bearing on whether a startup adopts a staggered board.  
 
IV.D. CEO Turnover 
In this section we examine the effect of strategic CVC investments on CEO 
turnover. We are particularly interested in forced CEO turnovers since this is an 
important measure of managerial entrenchment. This follows because entrenched   31
managers are less susceptible to involuntary departures since they are not exposed to 
strong board oversight or market pressure.  
To identify CEO turnover, we rely on information taken from proxy statements in 
the five years following the IPO. In our panel data, we have 1,093 firm-years and 273 
firms and we observe 170 CEO departures. We then identify forced departures by reading 
news reports in Factiva around the time of the CEO change. Forced turnovers are those 
reported to be due to dismissals or firings by the board, departures following poor 
performance or firm scandals, cases where CEOs depart for a lower status job (if the 
CEO is under 60) or fails to take a new executive position within 12 months, and other 
similar circumstances. In total we have 40 forced departures, which translates into a 
23.5% turnover rate. Other studies report similar turnover rates (for example, Huson, 
Parino, and Starks (2001) report a rate of 23.4%, while Faleye (2006) reports a rate of 
23%). 
To test whether the presence of a strategic CVC investor is associated with higher 
forced turnover, we estimate this panel data using a logistic model with industry fixed 
effects and standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. The 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO departure is forced 
and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable of interest is an indicator variable, 
Strategic, that equals one if there is strategic CVC investor. Since prior studies identify 
several factors that influence CEO turnover, we include these as control variables. The 
first control variable captures past stock return performance in the calendar year 
preceding the IPO (see Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Warner, Watts, and Wruck 
(1988)) measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns, where we adjust returns by 
subtracting the return on the CRSP equal-weighted portfolio of NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq   32
stocks. Yermack (1996) finds a negative relation between board size and forced turnover, 
while Goyal and Park (2002) documents a similar relation between the probability of 
forced turnover and a dual CEO-chairman of the board.  To take these effects into 
account, we include board size and an indicator for a dual CEO-chairman as regressors. 
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) show that a CEO is more likely to continue in the position 
as his or her shareholdings in the firm rise, while Weisbach (1988) finds that forced CEO 
turnover is more likely if the board is dominated by outside directors. Thus, we also use 
CEO ownership and an indicator for boards having a majority outside directors as 
regressors. All the control variables are measured in the year prior to the CEO’s 
departure.  
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 8. In the first model, we 
include a strategic CVC indicator to investigate whether there is a general impact of 
strategic CVC investments on forced turnovers. We find that the presence of a strategic 
CVC is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of forced CEO departure. The 
Strategic indicator has a positive coefficient of 0.713 and a significant t-statistic of 2.06. 
The result is also economically significant. The odds ratio for the strategic CVC indicator 
is 2.04, which means that strategic CVC backing increases the odds of forced turnover by 
more than a 100%. Alternatively, the result suggests that strategic CVC backing increase 
the probability of forced CEO turnover by 34%. This result supports H3. 
We next examine is the impact of a lead strategic CVC investor on forced CVC 
turnover (Model 2). CVCs should be able to put stronger pressure on CEOs if they are the 
leading VC syndicate investor, since they generally have greater board power. To test the 
validity of this prediction, we interact the CVC Strategic indicator with an indicator for 
them also being a lead investor. The results support a positive relation between the   33
presence of strategic CVC investors and forced CEO departures since the coefficient on 
the strategic CVC indicator is positive (0.841) and significant (t-stat=2.28). The odds 
ratio for this coefficient is 2.32, which implies that strategic CVC investments increase 
the odds in favor of forced CEO turnover by 132%. Consistent with our other finding for 
lead strategic CVCs, the probability of forced CEO removal is not significantly related to 
the interaction term Strategic Lead. This may reflect the greater influence of the CEO in 
these firms due to the greater concern about lead CVC investors having conflicts of 
interest as shown in Masulis and Nahata (2007).  Thus, having a CVC investor results in 
a higher probability of forced CEO departure, but only when there is strategic fit between 
the IPO firm and the CVC parent.
8 This supports our initial conjecture that strategic CVC 
investors have greater incentives and ability to curb managerial entrenchment in order to 
protect their investments. Turning to the other control variables, we find that past firm 
performance is negatively correlated with the likelihood of forced CEO departure, which 
is consistent with findings in previous studies.  
In the third column of the table (Model 3), we examine the impact of strategic 
CVC investments on the performance-sensitivity of CEO turnover by creating an 
interaction term between past stock return performance and the strategic CVC indicator 
variable. The coefficient on Strategic Past return is negative, but insignificant (t-statistic 
= -0.18). The result suggests that strategic CVC investors do not increase the sensitivity 
of CEO turnover to performance.  
                                                 
8 Since boards seem to be more sensitive to ROA performance relative to stock performance 
according to Graham and Harvey (200?) survey, we test for the sensitivity of CEO forced turnover to ROA 
performance with the addition of an interaction term. We find similar results to when we examine the past 
stock return performance, namely that the coefficient associated with ROA is significant and negative, and 
the interaction term with the Strategic indicator is insignificant.  
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Lastly, we examine the impact of strategic CVC investments on the probability of 
CEO turnover for a sample that includes only firm years with CEO turnover (Model 4). 
Here, the indicator variable equals one if CEO departure is forced, and zero if it is 
voluntary. The coefficient on Strategic is again positive (0.853) and statistically 
significant (t-stat=2.01). For the control variables, we find a significant negative relation 
between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and a dual CEO-chairman (t-stat=-1.77), 
which is consistent with more powerful CEOs being less likely to be fired.  
 
V. Strategic corporate venture capital investments versus strategic relationships 
One potential explanation for the results in the previous section is that they are 
due to other established strategic relationships. VC backed IPOs sometimes enter into 
various types of strategic relationships with established corporations and these 
relationships may also create incentive to establish corporate governance structures 
similar to those frequently found in the presence of strategic CVC investments. To 
investigate this possibility, we include VC backed IPOs with strategic relationships in our 
analysis. For the period 1992-1999, there are 133 VC backed IPOs which enter in 
strategic relationships or strategic alliances with established corporations. We add these 
IPO firms to the sub-sample of 94 strategic CVC backed IPOs to form a new sample of 
227 IPO firms with strategic relationships. We then compare the board composition, 
independence of audit and compensation committees, and the use of staggered board 
provisions between strategic CVC backed IPOs and VC backed IPOs with other strategic 
corporate relationships.  
Table 9 presents the results for board independence. Again, the main variable of 
interest is the indicator variable denoting strategic CVC backing. We find that even after   35
controlling for the presence of corporate alliances, strategic CVC backed IPOs continue 
to have more independent boards. In the resulting pooled time series cross-sectional 
regressions where we adjust for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering, the strategic CVC 
indicator is positive (0.03) and significant at conventional levels for all the model 
specifications (t-stat=1.81). The same result holds when we use year and firm fixed 
effects (Model 2) and random effects models (Model 3). The coefficient on the strategic 
CVC indicator is highest in the fixed effects model (0.196 with t-stat=13.65), which 
suggests that every strategic CVC IPO has one more independent director than IPOs with 
business alliances. Some of the other control variables are also significant in various 
specifications. Additionally, we estimate probit models for the independence of the audit 
and compensation committees (similar to the analysis in section IV.B.) and perform a 
univariate analysis of staggered boards. We do not find any significant differences with 
respect to composition of audit and compensation committees or the use of staggered 
boards. 
Lastly, we investigate whether CEO forced turnover is more likely for strategic 
CVC backed IPOs than IPOs with only other strategic relationships. As in Section IV.C., 
we examine the frequency of forced CEO departures for the sample of IPOs with 
strategic relationships using Factiva and other news sources. We identify 61 CEO 
turnovers, 14 of which we identify as forced. Combining the two sub-samples yields 35 
forced departures in a total of 925 firm-year observations. We use again use a cross-
sectional time series logistic model with corrections for heteroscedasticity and firm 
clustering. The dependent variable is one if the CEO is forced to depart and zero 
otherwise. We use the same control variables as in Section IV.C.    36
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 10. Model 1 includes an 
indicator for strategic CVC investments. Its coefficient is positive (0.663) and significant 
at conventional levels (t-stat=1.77), which implies that CEOs of strategic CVC IPOs are 
more likely to be forced out. In Model 2 we include an indicator variable for when a CVC 
is the lead VC syndicate member. The coefficient on this indicator is not statistically 
significant, but the coefficient on Strategic is 0.74 and significant at the 6% level. The 
odds ratio for this variable is 2.09, which suggests that having a strategic CVC investor 
increases the likelihood of CEO forced departure by almost 110% compared to the 
presence of other strategic relationships. Lastly, in Model 3 we examine whether the 
presence of a strategic CVC investor increases the turnover-performance sensitivity by 
including an interaction term between Strategic and the firm’s market adjusted return. 
This interaction term is positive (0.315) and significant (t-stat=1.76), consistent with 
firms backed by strategic CVC investors experiencing greater CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivities. In addition, the coefficient on Strategic is positive (0.951) and significant (t-
stat=2.41), which is further support for the disciplining effect of strategic CVCs, even 
when the market for corporate control is restricted by strong ATPs..  
Overall, our results suggest that strategic CVC investors tend to be associated 
with more independent boards and a higher likelihood of forced CEO departures. One 
explanation for these results is that CVCs have a greater incentive and ability to influence 
the corporate governance structures in their startup investments. The mean ownership 
stake of strategic CVCs is 16.4%, compared to 2.5% for alliance partners (the median for 
these is 0). Thus, strategic CVCs backing IPO firms have more at stake compared to 
when IPO firms with strategic corporate partners. Thus, CVCs are likely to work harder 
to protect their investments in the former cases.    37
 
VI. Conclusion 
We investigate how differences in investment incentives and strategies between 
CVCs and TVCs affect corporate governance structures of IPO firms. We hypothesize 
that strategic investments by CVCs can lead to certain type of corporate governance 
structure, which reflect the nature of strategic alliances between CVC parents and 
startups and the need for CVCs to protect their strategic investments. On the other hand, 
we do not expect any significant differences between TVC backed IPOs and IPOs backed 
by CVCs that invest purely for financial reasons. We test three hypotheses regarding the 
effects of prior CVC funding of IPO firms which is related to their continued 
involvement after the IPO, the degree of independence of the board and key board 
committees, and the level of managerial entrenchment. We test our hypotheses using a 
sample of 276 IPOs during 1992-1999, supplemented by a large amount of hand collected 
corporate governance data.   
Consistent with the strategic alliance hypotheses, we find that IPO firms backed 
by strategic CVCs have more outsiders on the board and more independent directors on 
compensation committees than a set of matched firms or a set of IPO firms backed by 
purely financially motivated CVCs. In addition, forced CEO turnover is more likely in 
such IPOs. Both results are statistically and economically significant. We do not find any 
significant differences between the board composition and forced CEO turnover in IPO 
firms backed by financial CVCs and a set of matched firms. In addition, we find that 
strategic CVC backed IPOs have stronger anti-takeover protections than other IPOs, and 
that the difference is mainly due to heavy use of staggered boards. We interpret this as 
reflecting CVC concerns for protecting the strategic relationships that these IPO firms   38
have with the CVCs’ parents. Our explanation is that although ATPs produce greater 
managerial entrenchment, there is an offsetting benefit for CVCs since they prevent 
competitors from acquiring CVC backed IPOs and potentially destroying valuable 
strategic relationships. In addition, the managerial entrenchment effect of anti-takeover 
devices is at least partially counteracted by more independent boards and compensation 
committees. Lastly, we compare IPO firms backed by strategic CVCs to IPO firms with 
general strategic relationships with other corporations and find that they look similar with 
respect to the independence of board committees and use of anti-takeover defense 
mechanisms. However, firms backed by strategic CVCs continue to have significantly 
more independent directors and a higher likelihood of forced CEO turnover, especially in 
the face of poor firm performance.    39
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for our IPO samples  
 
The sample consists of 276 venture backed IPOs for the period 1992-1999. Strategic CVCs are IPOs which 
have a strategic relationship with their CVC investor. Financial CVCs are IPOs which have no strategic 
relationship with their CVC investor. Matching sample in each case is a sample of TVC backed IPOs from 
the same industry (three- and four-digit SIC) and with similar size (based on pre-IPO sales). Age is 
measured as of the IPO year. R&D intensity is calculated as R&D expenses (Compustat item43) divided by 
total assets (Compustat item6). Underwriter rank is calculated using the approach in Carter and Manaster 
(1990). Lead VC age is the age of the lead venture capitalist in the year of the offering. Lead VC is the VC 
with the earliest investment in the company. The symbols ***, **, * represent statistically significant 
differences between strategic and financial CVC IPOs and their respective matching firms at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% based on nonparametric Mann-Whitney test for equality of medians. 
 
  Strategic CVC IPOs    Financial CVC IPOs 
Variables CVCs  Matching 
sample   CVCs Matching 
sample 
Number of companies  94  94    44  44 
Age at IPO  5.3 
(4.0) 
5.2 





Pre-IPO sales (mill.)  11.2 
(5.3) 
11.0 












Pre-IPO R&D Intensity (%)  41.4 
(27.8) 
36.6 





















Lead VC age  14.1 
(13.5) 
15.6 




Main industries – SIC codes  73, 28, 36, 
38, 48     73, 36, 35, 
38, 28 
 
Major CVC investors 




Cisco Syst.(5)  
AOL(4) 
MediaOne(4) 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for strategic and financial CVC backed IPOs 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 94 strategic and 44 financial CVC backed IPOs CVC backed IPOs for 
the period 1992-1999. Strategic CVC IPOs are IPOs which have a strategic relationship with their CVC investor. Financial 
CVC backed IPOs are cases where the IPO issuer has no strategic relationship with the CVC parent. Both strategic and 
financial CVC backed IPOs have TVC investors as well. Matching TVC IPOs in each case is a sample of TVC backed IPOs 
from the same industry (three- and four-digit SIC) and with similar size (based on pre-IPO sales). Year 0 is the IPO year. The 
symbols ***, **, * represent statistically significant differences between strategic CVC IPOs and their matching firms at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% based on nonparametric Mann-Whitney test for equality of medians. 
 
Panel A. Strategic CVC backed IPOs 
Variables – mean (median)  Year -1  Year 0  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
              
Ownership              




























              
Board size               
























              
Number of venture directors               












    TVC directors –coinvesting 













    TVC directors – matching  













              
CEO ownership               




























     Strategic CVC vs. CEO –   















              
CEO tenure – years               
























              
% outside directors               























(71.4)   42
              
% inside directors               

























Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B. Financial CVC backed IPOs 
Variables – mean (median)  Year -1  Year 0  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
            
Ownership            




























            
Board  size            
























            
Number of venture directors               












    TVC directors – coinvesting 













    TVC directors – matching  













            
CEO  ownership            




























     Financial CVC vs. CEO –  















            
CEO tenure (years)               
























            
%  outside  directors            
























              43
% inside directors               

























   44
Table 4 
Board composition and strategic CVC investments 
 
The table presents the results of a pooled cross-sectional time series regression of the fraction of outsiders on the company’s board 
on a number of explanatory variables for the period 1992-1999. Strategic is an indicator that equals one if there is a strategic CVC 
investor. Leading CVC is the first CVC investor in the firm. CEO-chairman and CEO-founder are respectively indicators that equal 
one if the CEO is also a chairman of the board and if the CEO is a firm founder. VC reputation is the age of the lead VC. R&D 
intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D to total assets in the previous year. Firm risk is measured as the industry median standard 
deviation of stock returns in the previous year. Competitive industry is the Herfindahl index for the respective 2-digit SIC code. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering. The t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
 
Panel A. Whole sample results 
  Percentage of outsiders on the board 








  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 










Strategic CVC lead    -0.006 
[-0.30]    -0.007 
[-0.36]   
CEO  characteristics:         






























     CEO-founder  0.011 
[0.68] 








Firm  characteristics:         






































































Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Firm and year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Intercept  0.736 
[18.55] 
0.737 




Num.  Obs.  1201  1201 1201 1201  1201   45
Adjusted R
2    0.11  0.11 0.57 0.05   